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Abstract
This paper outlines the foundations of corporate governance. The discussion in-
cludes a review on the modern corporation, transaction costs theory, agency costs
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The Industrial Revolution of the 19th century with its technological advances and its
increasingly capital-intensive (mass) production processes increased the optimal size of
many firms (see Jensen, 1993). Their greater production capacity made them difficult
to be financed by a single person. In consequence, former sole proprietorships were
being replaced by large public corporations with limited liability along with somewhat
dispersed ownership (Holderness, 2003). Ownership and control were separated and, as
a result, the foundations of economic activity changed. The owner and the manager were
no longer one and the same person.1
A firm’s capital requirements can be met in the form of debt or equity, respectively in
a combination of the two. Providers of debt receive a pre-fixed and stable return of cash
flows. Additionally, debtholders can claim collateral in the case of payment default, and
they can adjust the contract if pre-specified covenants are breached. Hence, debtholders
are exposed to relatively low risk, however, with naturally limited return potential.
In contrast, providers of equity are only apt to invest their wealth in risky firms if
they can be sure of receiving a return once all expenses including the managers’ com-
pensation have been paid. Shareholders are only entitled to the residual claim on the
earnings. Hence, there is a potential conflict of interest between shareholders and man-
agers. As a consequence, equity-investors depend on the credibility of managers, corpo-
rate governance, and a well-functioning legal system that prevents any of the owners’
capital being expropriated by the managers who are in control of it.
Excursus: The Ownership of the Modern Corporation
U.S. corporations are characterized as being held by dispersed shareholders with only
small interest in the corporation. This situation accentuates the problem of self-
interested managers mentioned earlier, a phenomenon which is observed all over the
world and not only in the United States. Nevertheless, the extent of problems between
managers and shareholders depends on the ownership structure of the firm and the
identity of the shareholders (see Bogle, 2005). Variations in the ownership structure are
observed over the time, but also across firms and countries.
On the one hand, some listed firms and most non-listed firms, are held by strong
shareholders with significant voting rights. These "controlling" shareholders often take
an active part in the firm’s business (owner-capitalism). As a result, ownership and
control partly overlap and conflicts of interest decrease.
On the other hand, some firms are held by dispersed and passive shareholders.
The managers of these firms are hardly monitored and, as a result, they try to run
1See Cooter and Ulen (2008) for a discussion of different financing sources depending on the firm’s stage
of development and the quality of the institutional framework within a country.
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the company for their own private benefits and to consolidate their position (manager-
capitalism). Frequently, such firms grow beyond their optimal size and diversify into
different business segments.
However, badly managed firms can become subject to shareholder interventions. For
instance, some institutional investors intervene successfully to change a firm’s struc-
ture. Other firms disappear completely once taken over by or merged with another firm.
Waves of mergers and acquisitions have been observed since the inception of the mod-
ern corporations. For instance, the merger wave in 1890 transformed relatively small
corporations into larger entities (see Jensen, 1993). More recently, so-called alternative
investors such as private equity funds have continued to restructure corporations, often
by leveraged buy-outs focusing on core competencies and changing corporate governance
(Jensen, 1993).
Other countries determine their individual ownership specifications, which, in turn,
entail other respective agency problems. For instance, in Germany, banks tend to play
an important role ("Hausbankensystem"). In France, firms are affected by interventions
of the state. And in other continental European countries and in Asia, firms are typically
held by large industrial groups or family clans (Kraakman et al., 2009).
1 Transaction Cost Theory
Modern corporations have relatively easy access to finance; however, their shareholders
are heavily reliant on the managers. Two related questions arise: why do people create
firms if they trigger such problems? And why do they not trade their products and ser-
vices on markets? Coase (1937) argued that the integration of trade within a firm takes
place if the transaction costs using the market are higher than the costs using an internal
organization. The reason is that, in contrast to neoclassical assumptions, using the mar-
ket is not free of costs. In the real world, there are no frictionless markets (see Allen et
al., 2009). These transaction costs include the costs of information, search, negotiation
and re-negotiation, contracting, and enforcement (see Williamson, 1985). Transaction
costs exacerbate the problems associated with setting a complex bilateral, long-term,
and complete contract. Complete contracts would contain all information about the fu-
ture and instructions for every possible state of the world.2 In conclusion, if complete
2In the context of contracts, frequently one of the parties has an information advantage. The problem
of asymmetric information emerges before and after a contract has been written. Ex-ante, the qualities
of the parties involved; i.e., their characteristics and intentions, are often unobservable (Arrow, 1984).
There is a risk of an adverse selection; i.e., the risk of choosing a bad counterparty. The second problem
of asymmetric information occurs after the completion of the contract. Ex-post, moral hazard can be an
issue. The contracting parties may not behave as expected, and the (hidden) action cannot be observed.
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contracts were feasible, all transactions would take place on markets and not within a
corporate hierarchy.
2 Agency Cost Theory
Corporations accomplish an important task and fulfill incomplete contracts at the lowest
costs. However, again, a complete contract between managers and shareholders is not
feasible. As a result, there is leeway that might be exploited by the managers, and, in
consequence, shareholders might be harmed.
As early as 1776, the famous Scottish economist Adam Smith described this prob-
lem as a conflict that occurs when someone controls resources that he does not own
personally. However, contrary to his misgivings "joint-stock companies" did successfully
survive (see Allen et al., 2009). In 1932, Berle and Means addressed this concern and
related it expressly to modern corporations with their typical separation of ownership
from control. Finally, in 1976, Jensen and Meckling termed this conflict of interest be-
tween shareholders and managers the principal-agent problem, regarding it as the cause
of so-called agency costs. The problem occurs if a principal employs an agent to act on
his behalf, the two parties being both rational and self-interested. Most commonly and
in respect to corporations, the principal-agent problem describes the problem between
managers (agents) and shareholders (principals). However, agency relationships occur
in many other situations.3
Agency costs accrue when managers do not behave in the way the suppliers of finance
desire. Shareholders expect the managers to use their resources in a productive way.
They should invest the money in positive net present value projects that increase firm
value and, thereby, the residual claim for shareholders. In contrast, if there are no prof-
itable investment opportunities, money should be returned to shareholders. However, re-
ality is not always as idealistic as this, and the interests of principals and agents are not
always aligned. Generally speaking, self-interested managers may pursue shareholder
value-reducing activities, increase their personal benefits, and thereby find themselves
unable to provide the risk-adjusted return that the shareholders expect to receive.
Shareholders have difficulties evaluating the actions of the managers, because the
asymmetric distribution of information causes managers to profit from an informational
advantage. Managers typically have more information about the firms’ situation and its
3Basically, such costs arise whenever a principal delegates work to an agent (e.g., a patient-physician
relationship). In addition, within a corporation various conflicts of interest can occur. They can involve
managers and directors, shareholders and directors, different groups of shareholders (see Shleifer and
Vishny, 1997) or debtholders and equityholders (see Myers, 1977). The underinvestment and overin-
vestment theories both deal with the conflict between debt- and shareholders. Furthermore, corporate
restructuring or the decision on how to finance or invest is regularly related to the question of whether the
rationale solves an old agency problem or creates a new one.
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daily business than investors do. This information advantage allows them to undertake
discretionary spending. Furthermore, shareholders often do not close the asymmetry, be-
cause the acquisition of information and their monitoring efforts are costly. In addition,
the efforts would be shared with free-riding fellow shareholders. In such circumstances,
monitoring would assume the form of a public good, and the effort thus produced would
be sub-optimal.
These conflicts of interest intensify, because financial incentives between sharehold-
ers and managers typically differ substantially. In contrast to shareholders, managers
remunerated by fixed compensation do not participate in the gains when the firm’s value
increases. However, they can invest the shareholders’ money in activities that augment
their private benefits. Hence, the problem becomes more aggravated, the less financially
committed the manager is to the firm (see Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In addition, man-
agers are usually more risk-averse than shareholders, which further misaligns the inter-
ests. While shareholders can diversify their financial risk over different investments,
professional managers are typically specialized in their field of work and risk their job if
projects fail (see Eisenhardt, 1989).
Managerial activities that reduce the profits available for shareholders are manifold,
some more obvious than others (see Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Managers can expro-
priate money, for instance, by selling firm assets to their own companies at lower prices.
Other private benefits include the consumption of perquisites. This includes expensively
furnished modern offices, fancy company cars, luxurious corporate trips or company jets.
Furthermore, managers may try to expand their firm’s size, pursue "pet projects", and
create an "empire" that increases their claim for remuneration that is often linked to
sales, and makes them more difficult to being dismissed since their personal contribu-
tion is less easy to assess (see Jensen, 1986; Shleifer and Vishny, 1989).
3 Legal Protection
There is basic legal protection against managerial misbehavior that applies in any eco-
nomic activity. Notably, duty of care and duty of loyalty restrict a manager’s capability
to expropriate shareholders. The legal framework within a country defines the scope
and terms of its corporate governance rulings. Empirical evidence shows that the level
of investor protection is related to the level of equity investments and corporate gover-
nance (La Porta et al., 2002). Countries with insufficient legal enforcement are seen to
be associated with a lower quality of corporate governance and are observed to have diffi-
culty in attracting external capital (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Furthermore, other legal
mechanisms such as disclosure practices or transparency requirements help investors to
reduce information asymmetry. The legal framework sets strict rules of investor protec-
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tion and indirectly influences the configuration of corporate governance at firm level (see
Easterbrook and Fischel, 1989).
4 Corporate Governance
Corporate governance can be defined as a set of (mostly voluntary) devices that aim to
protect investors against managerial misbehavior. "Good" corporate governance is be-
lieved to reduce the likelihood of bad or wrong management and, as a result, to create
shareholder value. However, its form and implementation are largely left to the discre-
tion of the firms. Corporate governance is set up in two steps.
In the first step, the founders decide on the firm’s form of incorporation. The corporate
form is written down in the articles of incorporation and the bylaws (see Kraakman et
al., 2009). Thereby, the founders record the firm’s basic governance principles and define
the desired investor base. For instance, the specification of the capital structure can
favor some investors over other; e.g., by means of a dual-class share structure.
In the second step, the shareholders — who are free to invest or not — may change
the firm’s governance after the firm has been established and the capital has been raised.
This can be done through voting at general meetings or more directly, by electing conve-
nient directors on the board.
Furthermore, corporate governance can be separated into mechanisms that are firm-
internal or firm-external. The most important corporate governance devices include the
board of directors, the shareholders, the market for corporate control, the capital struc-
ture, executive compensation, and, not least, competition at various firm levels.
4.1 Internal Governance Mechanisms
– Board of directors
The board of directors is elected by the shareholders at the general meeting and repre-
sents their interests. Consequently, its most important task is to monitor management
on the shareholders’ behalf.4 This implies that its primary responsibility, upon which its
legitimacy rests, is to reduce agency costs. As such, the directors’ responsibility is to fire
bad managers and to reject unprofitable long-term investments.5 For this reason, the
composition and structure of the board is an important topic in corporate governance.
Crucial factors at board level include the independence of the board vis-à-vis the
management, including CEO duality, and the commitment of directors outside the board
4In this thesis, the board is mainly viewed from an agency perspective. However, some alternative the-
ories explain the board and its function, as well. Examples include the stewardship theory (Donaldson and
Davis, 1991; Davis et al., 1997), resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), and management
entrenchment theory (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989).
5Kind and Schläpfer (2011) show that stock markets react negatively to the dismissal of good CEOs.
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room. Furthermore, board composition is important, e.g., the professional and personal
profiles of its directors. However, in the past, directors have often been blamed for not
protecting shareholder interests, for colluding with management, and for being too pas-
sive in general.6
Excursus: Comparison of Boards in an International Context
Boards are broadly classified into one-tier (unitary or monistic) boards and two-tier
boards. In a system of one-tier boards, all responsibility is delegated to one corporate
body. Hence, this form of board typically consists of executive and non-executive direc-
tors. In this case, the executive directors both manage and supervise daily business. In
contrast, two-tier boards have a supervisory board that is separated from the manage-
ment board and which consists solely of non-executive directors. In practice, two-tier
boards are prevalent in most of Continental Europe even though one-tier boards are
legally allowed.
• Boards in the United States and the United Kingdom are one-tiered. The structure
allows executives to hold positions on the board, sometimes led by a CEO who is
also chairman of the board at the same time. However, in most cases, an executive
management is in charge of daily business. Directors are elected by shareholders
at the annual general meeting.
In the United States, 54 percent of all boards have a combined leadership struc-
ture (RiskMetrics Groups, 2008). In contrast, the chairman and CEO positions are
usually separated in the United Kingdom. Only 16 percent of U.K. firms exhibit
CEO duality (see Weir et al., 2002).
In Switzerland, the board of directors is legally an executive body. However, typ-
ically, the board of directors ("Verwaltungsrat") is the supervising organ, while
operating activities are delegated to a management board ("Geschäftsleitung" or
"Konzernleitung"). The general meeting ("Generalversammlung") elects the board
of Swiss firms.
• Two-tier boards have a supervisory board that is strictly separated from the man-
agement board. In consequence, the supervisory board is composed solely of non-
executive directors.
In Germany, the dual board system consists of a management board ("Vorstand")
and a supervisory board ("Aufsichtsrat"). The supervisory board consists of solely
6However, corporate governance devices such as the board of directors are present in other organiza-
tional forms that have no explicit financial objectives (e.g., universities or NGOs.)
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non-executive directors and is elected by the general meeting ("Hauptversamm-
lung"). In addition, a percentage must be employee representatives.
In France, both types are common. One-tier boards are denominated "conseils
d’administration". Such firms are usually guided by the président-directeur-
générale (PDG). He represents the board operatively as their delegate ("delegué")
on the management board and is usually the CEO ("directeur générale") and chair-
man ("président du conseil d’administration") in one person. In contrast, two-tier
boards consist of the supervisory board ("conseil de surveillance") and the manage-
ment board ("directoire") similar to German boards. The general meeting ("assem-
blée générale") elects the directors.
– Shareholders
Shareholders do, at least partially, monitor the management themselves. They have the
right to vote on important corporate decisions, especially on who is appointed to the board
of directors. However, the ownership of firms is commonly too fragmented for sharehold-
ers to be motivated to take action on issues. Because of free-riding co-owners, individual
investors are rather passive. In contrast, large shareholders, so-called blockholders or
controlling shareholders, usually have an incentive to actively monitor management.
However, as the controlling shareholders gain influence, other conflicts might emerge.
The interests of controlling shareholders and minority shareholders might collide. Con-
trolling shareholders might only act on issues that are beneficial for them. In this case,
a trade-off evolves between weak and excessively powerful shareholders.
– Executive compensation
In contrast to the two monitoring devices mentioned before, executive compensation can
be used to incentivize the management. Variable compensation ("pay-for-performance")
can align the interests of both the management and the shareholders (Jensen and Meck-
ling, 1976). However, one important condition for this mechanism to work properly is
the fact that the manager’s performance and quality is reflected in the market price, and
this requires an efficient capital market. In fact, executive compensation nowadays is
rather seen as a agency problem than a governance device. Overly powerful corporate
managers are empowered to dictate the level and the configuration of the salary to a
seemingly helpless board.
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4.2 External Governance Mechanisms
– Market for corporate control and takeover defenses
The market for corporate control, including the fear of hostile takeovers, can also dis-
cipline the management (Manne, 1965; Jensen and Ruback, 1983). This mechanism
is particularly important in Anglo-Saxon countries where the ownership of the firms is
commonly dispersed and the capital markets efficient. If stock prices reflect the ability of
the management, poor managerial decisions lead to falling prices and, thereby, increase
the probability of the firm becoming a takeover target. Thus, managers adopt actions
that sustain firm value.
However, the board can also install takeover defenses to mitigate this mechanism.
Takeover defenses differ substantially across countries and firms, but their objective is
always the same. They decrease the probability of a hostile takeover, which has the
consequence of entrenching the management.
– Capital structure
The configuration of the capital structure can also be a means for disciplining the man-
agement. High debt and pre-determined interest payments, in contrast to the residual
claims by shareholders, put pressure on the management and make them economize
resources. In short, interest payments reduce the free cash available for investments in
negative net present value projects (see Jensen, 1986). Furthermore, the credit ratings of
debt-issuing firms can reduce information asymmetry between managers and debthold-
ers. However, conflicts of interest between debt- and shareholders can arise (see Myers,
1977).
– Competition
Competition is a natural mechanism that prevents wasting money and acts on three
main markets. Firstly, as discussed before, the market for corporate control exposes
badly run companies to the danger of a hostile takeover. Secondly, the managerial labor
market allows managers to signal their ability in order to increase their market value
and prestige (see Fama, 1980). Thirdly, competition in the product market leads to an
economization of resources in order to remain competitive and in the market (see Beiner
et al., 2009).
5 Determinants of Corporate Governance
Effective corporate governance has to be adequately structured in line with the firm’s en-
vironment. The firm’s environment includes three broad areas. Firstly, the legal frame-
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work sets the scope of governance exogenously. This can be understood as the under
and upper bounds of discretionary leeway in creating firm-specific governance. Secondly,
the corporate governance pattern can actively influence the relative strength of various
institutions within a firm (e.g., share- or debtholders). Thirdly, the operational environ-
ment determines the requirements of an optimal corporate governance structure (e.g.,
depending on the industrial affiliation).
5.1 Legal Environment
A firm’s legal environment is defined primarily by the written legislation and the law
enforcement by the state. In Switzerland, the Code of Obligations (SCO) of 1911 in-
cludes contract law, company law, and securities law and specifies the firm’s leeway in
structuring corporate governance. In addition, listed corporations have to comply with
the Stock Exchange Act (SESTA) of 1995. Furthermore, some industries such as the
banking industry are subject to specific regulations.
Moreover, the SIX Exchange Listing Rules set reporting requirements for financial
transparency and corporate governance, among other things. Economiesuisse, an or-
ganization of the Swiss economy, has also published guidelines for best practice in cor-
porate governance called "Swiss Code of Best Practice for Corporate Governance" (see
Economiesuisse, 2008).
Finally, companies cross-listed outside of Switzerland are affected by foreign corpo-
rate governance codes and legislation. As the case may be, cross-listed firms in the
United States have to comply with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and New York Stock
Exchange listing rules.
5.2 Corporate Governance Environment
The general corporate governance environment (or primarily the corporate ownership
structure) determines some of the agency problems occurring in a firm. Shareholders can
influence corporate governance as they can elect the directors and vote for a change in
the firm’s articles of incorporation. Strong investors can mitigate the problems between
managers and shareholders, but they can equally instigate issues between themselves
and other investors.
In addition, takeover defenses implemented by boards hamper shareholder action
and insulate them from the hazards presented by the market for corporate control.
Hence, the general corporate governance of a firm influences the relative importance
of other corporate governance devices.
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5.3 Operational Environment
The operational or economic environment specifies the firm’s requirements set for cor-
porate governance. Corporate governance should be adapted to the firm’s needs. Small
and fast-growing companies in specific industries may have other corporate governance
requirements than those suited to large, mature, and diversified firms. As an example,
Lehn et al. (2009) find evidence that boards adapt their structure endogenously to their
operational circumstances (e.g., firm size, industry affiliation, and complexity).
6 Conclusions
Complete contracts are not feasible, because the transaction costs impede contracts that
specify instructions in each state of the world. As a result, firms are established that
reduce the transaction costs accrued using the market. The capital-intensive, modern
firms that emerged after the Industrial Revolution faced a radical rise in their need for
financial funding. The finance was provided — among others — by many small equity
investors. In contrast to sole proprietors, those shareholders yielded the control of their
resources to managers. The resulting separation of ownership from control led to so-
called agency problems. The problem is that managers do not necessarily always act
in the interest of the firm’s shareholders, which would entail maximizing firm value.
The aim of corporate governance is to protect investors against managerial misbehavior.
Effective corporate governance is therefore an essential factor in determining a firm’s
success, and to ensure this, its structure must be aligned to the firm’s environment.
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